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THE PERSISTENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEW YORK
CITY CONSTRUCTION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
CASEY ICHNIOWSKI

and ANNE PRESTON*

and weaknesses
This studyexploresthestrengths
of economicreasoningin explaining,
and suggesting
remediesfor,thestubborn
presenceof
in NewYorkCityconstruction.
In thisindustry,
racketeering
theauthors
cannotbe conductedefficiently
argue,transactions
eitherbetweena large
or within
a fewlargefirms.
numberof firms
Consequently,
criminals
can
toimposeorganization
on theindustry.
theirability
"sell,"and profit
from,
canpersist
toentryincertainmarkets
Criminal
becauseofbarriers
activity
within
andbecauseofindustry
characteristics
theindustry
suchas constant
accessto,worksites.The roleof unionsas a
changesof,and restricted
institution
criminalcontrol.These and
monopolizing
mayalso facilitate
are relevantto policymaking,the authors
othereconomichypotheses
even thoughtheycannotbe adequatelytestedwithavailable
maintain,
data.
In almosteverybranchof the manyactivities
thatenterinto
buildingconstruction
we found... combinations
rampantand
throttled.
uncheckedand competition
The result
completely
was accomplished
byall mannerof devices,fromtheflagrant
of bidsand illegalcombinations
matching
betweenemployers
to the surreptitious
and employeeassociations,
agencyof the
innocuousLuncheonClub undercoverof which
apparently
wasregulated,
production
andpricesfixed
territory
apportioned
betweenostensible
competitors.
-IntermediateReportoftheLockwoodCommission,
1922

THE existenceof widespreadillegalactiv-

ityin the New York Cityconstruction
industryhas been recognized at least since
the release of the Lockwood Commission's
reportin 1922. Despite periodicpublicout* Casey Ichniowski is Associate Professor at the
Columbia UniversityGraduate School of Business,
and Anne Preston is Assistant Professor at the W.
Averell Harriman School for Management and
Policy,SUNY at Stony Brook. They thank Tammy
Feldman forcommentson the paper and Maria Pilar
Perez and Milton Assang for research assistance.
They are indebtedto the staffand consultantsof the
Organized Crime Task Force of the State of New
York for insightfuldiscussions.

cries for more than sixtyyears, however,
thepatternof corruptionhas persisted.The
mostrecentpublicreporton the problemis
the InterimReport of the New York State
OrganizedCrimeTask Force (OCTF), "Corruptionand Racketeeringin the New York
CityConstructionIndustry"(OCTF 1988).1
' The OCTF is a New York state agency established in 1970 by New York Executive Law 70-a to
investigate and prosecute multi-countyorganized
criminalactivity.On June 25, 1985, Governor Mario
Cuomo requested the OCTF to investigateallegations of corruption in the New York City construction industry.
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One section of that report lists and describes31 separatecourtcases initiatedsince
1980 thatinvolvecriminalchargesand conin theNew Yorkmetvictionsin construction
ropolitanarea. This list is not exhaustive.
Rather,it selectivelycites cases to illustrate
thevariousdistinctiveformsof illegalactivity in this industry-among them, extortion,bribery,theft,fraudulentbilling,pension fund fraud, tax fraud, sabotage, bid
rigging,and crimes of violence, including
murder.2
Several New York City construction
unions have been involved in this illegal
activity.The OCTF (1988:70-73) reports
''criminalinvestigationsthathave revealed
La Cosa Nostra control over or influence
in" at least 13 constructionlocals in New
York City. Corruption and illegal activity
are by no means confined, however, to
constructionunions. The OCTF's Interim
Report contains numerous examples of
criminal activity by general contractors
and specialtysubcontractors,as well as by
governmentofficials.
In this study,we examine the persistent
patternof crimein New York Cityconstruction using the tools and perspectiveof economics.We attemptto identifyfundamental economic questions and issues relevant
and we suggesthow
to thiscriminalactivity,
economic principlescan, in theory,explain
we evaltheobservedpatterns.Furthermore,
uate how well the theoreticalexplanations
can be tested with available data and describethekindsof additionaldata thatwould
permitmore thoroughanalysis.Our examination shows that some insights can be
gained froman economic approach to this
difficult
problem,3but it also revealslimitationsof thatapproach.
2
thathave documentedextenOtherinvestigations
sive illegal activityin New York City construction
include investigativereportsin the New YorkTimesin
1982 (Oreskes 1982a, 1982b; Raab 1982) and the
"stingoperation"of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Organized Crime Strike Force for the
Eastern Districtof New York, code-named LILREX
(OCTF 1988: 10).
3 An earlierversionof thispaper was prepared for
the OCTF. Throughout, we relyon examples, cases,
and investigativework reported by the OCTF in its
InterimReport (1988).

The Structureof the New York City
ConstructionIndustry
CRIME FIGURE: Close the door, friend,we
got a problem. .. you got to understand
all right?This guywas beingset
something,
up [to get a contractaward],okay,by very,
okay?
veryheavypeople, includingmyself,
The priceswere all inflatedokay? If you
weren'tin there,I wantto tellyouwhatkind
of ball game you're in, okay? The lowest
price . . . was a milliondollarsmore than
whatyouwereaskingfor. . .
CONTRACTOR: You're laughing because
you'rein a lotof hotwater.
CRIME FIGURE: I'm laughingbecauseyou're
in a lotof hotwater.
-Intercepted conversationbetween
crimefigureand contractor(OCTF
1988:83)
Like the contractorin the conversation,
an economistwho is faced withexplaining
the persistenceof criminalorganizationin
New York City construction, and the
barriersto entryencountered by employers who refuseto participatein corruption
activitiesin that industry,is in some hot
water. An examination of the nature of
construction activitycan, however, provide some explanations of why criminal
organization has supplanted the rules of
competitivemarketsin some parts of the
industry.
The constructionprocess is a vertical
chain of sequential transactions.As in any
other industry,transactionsmay be conducted primarily between firms in a
marketor between agents or employeesof
a single firm. Markets involve many
potential buyers, with terms of exchange
given by market prices; economic activity
conducted inside a firm involves fewer
parties negotiatingthe termsof exchange
(Coase 1937). The nature of an industry's
transactionsis an importantdeterminant
of whether production and exchange in
that industryare organized primarilyin
the market or withinthe firm (see especially Williamson 1975:8-10). In the construction industry, however, there are
barriers bothto the formation of large,
vertically integrated firms and to the
formation of efficient markets. These
barriers create an opportunityfor orga-

This content downloaded from 165.82.13.252 on Tue, 28 Oct 2014 09:26:45 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION
nized crime to coordinate economic activityin parts of the industry.
Barriersto MarketFormation
Three basic characteristicsof construction transactionsand production make it
costlyand inefficientto conduct economic
activitythrough marketswith many relativelysmall firms. Instead, these factors
encourage the development of a vertically
integratedconstructionprocesswithineach
firm.
First,the production process involves a
series of sequential transactions.Extensive
coordination is needed to avoid delays,
which can be quite costlyin this industry.
Idle inputs are one major component of
the costs of delay. Furthermore,because
large constructionprojects are commonly
financed with multi-million-dollarloans,
one extra day of delay causes thousands of
dollars of interestcharges. As the number
of firms in a given stage of production
increases,costs and uncertaintyin coordinating a construction project will also
increase.
Second, the sequential nature of the
productionprocess,coupled withitsinherent complexity,makes constructionmarkets susceptibleto "moral hazard." Moral
hazard occurs when a participant in a
transactionbehaves opportunisticallyafter
the contractis implemented. In construction, the costs of production and the
qualityof the product at any stage depend
on the quality of work in previous stages.
Because it is costlyforone firmto monitor
the work of another, and difficultfor
someone withone specialtyto evaluate the
quality of output of workers with many
differentspecialties,opportunisticsubcontractorsmay not deliver promised quality
to the developer or to the contractorin the
next stage of the construction process.
Internal organization of transactionscan
reduce the occurrenceof such opportunistic behavior by institutinga monitoring
process and internalizingthe costs of poor
workmanshipacross stages of production
withina single firm.
Third, capital and human assets required in many phases of constructionare
highly specialized. Construction workers

551

often invest in very specialized training.
Much of the capital equipment used in
constructionis designed for specifictasks,
with limited value in alternativeuses. As
resources become more specialized and
their versatilitydecreases, the number of
potentialbuyers and sellers for any transaction becomes smaller and the marketdetermined terms of exchange less well
defined. In addition, contractsnegotiated
through markets cannot anticipate all
possible contingencies.Unforeseen events
may cause contractsto be renegotiatedor
possiblyeven cancelled. If partiesvoid the
initial transaction,both the owners and
employers of expensive specialized assets
incur considerable costs as those assets lie
idle and complex productionprocessesare
delayed. In such cases, internalorganization of transactions in firms allows for
more flexibleand adaptable contracts,and
thus becomes a more efficientmeans of
production (Williamson 1981:1548-49).
Barriersto Large Firms
Although there are forces discouraging
external market organization of transactions in the constructionindustry,there
are also forces discouraging firms from
internalizingtransactions.A firm is limited in how far it can grow and how many
transactionsit can subsume.
First, due to the long duration of a
single constructionproject and the many
processes involved in it, a developercontractor who is integrated vertically
across all stages of production cannot
guarantee full-timework for each type of
workerand continualuse of all specialized
equipment. Thus, costs of idle resources
could be even higherafterverticalintegration than they are when separate firms
conduct transactions.
Second, constructionactivityis highly
cyclical, and firms face high risks of
bankruptcyduring economic downturns.
Because of the specialization of capital
assets and limitson resale of equipment,
exit fromthisindustryis more costlythan
it is from many other industries. A
vertically integrated construction firm
would likely suffer much higher losses
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than other construction firms during
downturns.
Third, antitrustregulationplaces direct
legal limitson the extent to which firms
can expand vertically or horizontally.
Although expansion may reduce many
transaction costs, the accumulation of
market share is visible and potentially
illegal. In addition, in public construction
projectsin New York City,the Wicks Law
prohibits officials from letting construction contractsto a single contractorfor all
constructiontasks.4This regulationmakes
a legal combinationbetweena general and
a subordinatecontractorimpractical.
Opportunitiesfor Crime
There are considerable economic and
legal barriers to both the formation of
markets and the growth of vertically
integratedfirmsin the constructionindustry. The high potential profits in the
industry,however, are a strong incentive
for forming some system to organize
economic activity.Since New York City is
an international center for trade and
commerce,it is reasonable to assume that
the demand for officeand housing space
is both high and relativelyinelastic.At the
same time,there are geographic limitson
space and technologicallimitson high-rise
construction,so expansion of the supply
of space is costlyand limited.The price of
space is thereforehigh and probablywell
above unit input costs of constructionnet
of the costs of coordinatingand executing
transactions.
In the absence of another alternativefor
4 The Wicks Law, whichwas enacted in the 1930s,
applies to all public constructionprojects in New
York State with anticipatedcosts over $50,000. The
law requires governmentagencies to select separate
contractorsfor each of four categories of work:
plumbingand gas fitting;electrical;heating,ventilation,and air conditioning;and remainingwork.The
legal interpretationof the law has required that the
governmentagency lettingthe constructioncontract
superviseand coordinatethe separate contracts.The
law was designed to protectthe public fromcollusive
practices of general contractors.In practice, however, most industryparticipants feel that the law
and makes the industrymore
promotesinefficiency
susceptibleto racketeering(OCTF 1988:108-10).

coordinatingand executingeconomictransactions across the sequential stages of
production,firmswould grow to the limits
imposed by diseconomies of internalizing transactionsand by legal regulations.
Marketswould mediate transactionsacross
firms despite the costs of this form of
economic organization if market prices
were sufficientto cover these costs. The
potential profits in construction have,
however, attracted a third organizing
structureto the industry-organizedcrime.
Like the legal firm,organized crime is a
"governance structure" for internalizing
transactionswhere markets are a costly
method for conducting exchange (Schelling 1967). Criminal law obviouslyprohibits activitiessuch as extortion,bribery,and
theft,which too often characterize New
York Cityconstruction.The record leaves
no doubt, however, that legal deterrents
have not been completely effective. A
probable reason for this record is that the
cost of enforcingcriminallaw is higher in
constructionthan in other industries.One
factor that may make law enforcement
effortsespecially costlyis the mobilityof
resources and work locations in construction, where a work site exists only for the
length of a given project. Such mobility
seems to be an importantcharacteristicof
otherindustriesthatare plagued bycrime.
For example, Taft (1958:34) identified
"trucking, sections of the amusement
industry,and distributivetrades and services," in addition to the building trades,
as industries in which racketeering has
persistedover long periods.
Further hampering law enforcement
effortsis the restrictedaccess to construction work sitesthat is legallyrequired as a
safetyprecaution. Outsiders who venture
onto a work site are conspicuous, and
contractingfirmsand theiremployees can
often detect and evade those who try to
police transactions.Similarly,if barriersto
the formationof markets have kept the
number of firms small, organized crime
needs to monitor and control fewer
economic agents.
These characteristics of construction
that make the detection of illegal activity
relativelydifficultreduce the costs and
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risks of crime. The "supply" of criminal
activitywill thereforebe correspondingly
high.
Demand for the alternativegovernance
structure provided by organized crime
arises because there are valued services
that firmscannot provide legally without
significantcosts. The services that organized crime can promise to provide or
threatento withholdinclude coordinating
activityacross stages of a construction
project, monitoring opportunisticbehavior, and rationing business to "member"
firmsduring downturns.5
The organizationof economic activityin
this industry through criminal means is
thereforepartlya response to the barriers
to the growthof legal firmsand partlya
response to the high cost of detection of
criminal activity.There is also a third
principal economic motivationfor illegal
activityin construction.Governmentregulation of urban construction activityis
considerable. These regulations are attempts to reduce external costs imposed
on uninvolved individuals due to decreased access to streets,light,and other
amenities and increased probabilities of
construction-related
accidents. As pointed
out in "The Report of the Mayor's Blue
Ribbon Panel on Building Plan Examination and Review" (Shinn et al. 1986),
permitsare required in New York City at
virtually all stages of the construction
process to obtain approval of the placement of equipment in streets;the closing
of sidewalks; the operation of heavy
equipment; the ways in which a new
building will change the pattern of sunlight; and any effects on historic sites.
Obtaining permits and site inspections
prior to a constructionproject is itselfa
multi-yearprocess,according to the Shinn
Report. Furthermore,building inspectors
5 Although organized crime's control of the
construction
costs
processmay reduce transaction
throughimprovedcoordinationof operations,it
does notnecessarily
decreasetotalcostsof construction.Beneficiaries
of thecoordination
payextortion
fee and
fees.The difference
betweenthe extortion
the value of the improvedcoordination
determines
the effectof organizedcrimeon costsof construc-

tion.
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must approve the qualityof workmanship
at each stage of production.
Any regulations that raise private costs
to contractorsto minimizethe social costs
of constructioncreate furtheropportunities for someone to profit from illegal
behavior. For example, in 1986, the
Brooklynmanager of electricalinspections
was convicted of taking bribes from
electrical contractorsto speed up paperwork and overlook code violations. Such
bribes are not rare: during a three-month
undercover investigationin 1985, a city
building inspector was offered bribes in
return for favors by 28 owners and
contractors(OCTF 1988:22).6 Generally,
if the purpose of such bribes is to secure
the approval of relativelyshoddy construction, consumers of the office or housing
space, or even uninvolved third parties,
will bear the costs of repairs and material
failure and any added risks of unsafe
construction. In short, regulations that
shiftexternal costs to private contractors
provide contractorswith an incentive to
bribe those administeringthe regulations.
Specific Sources of Monopoly Power
Construction in the New York City
SMSA involved 12,304 business establishmentsin 1982 (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1982a:20), a figureapparentlysupporting
the usual characterizationof construction
as a highlycompetitiveindustry.Because
constructionrequires the production of a
great varietyof intermediategoods in its
sequential production process, however,
these thousands of firms are not all
competing with one another. To the
economist, therefore, construction is a
maze of subindustries. To analyze the
6
There are many other regulations that create
these kinds of opportunitiesfor bribery.Regulations
that restrictthe weight of concrete mixing trucks
below a truck'sfullload give driversthe opportunity
to ignore the regulationfor a fee. These bribes may
speed up the construction process and minimize
costly delays, but they do not necessarilyimprove
efficiency.If full trucksdamage Manhattan streets,
bribesto overlookthese regulationsincrease the costs
of road repairs and the probabilityof motor vehicle
accidents.
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specific sources of monopoly power in
construction,the three general principles
discussedabove-barriers to marketsacross
stages of construction,barriers to vertical
integrationby firms,and opportunitiesfor
criminalorganizationof economicactivitymust be borne in mind when examining
each stage and each intermediate good
involvedin the constructionprocess.
The forces that impose barriers to the
formation of efficient markets, impede
verticalintegrationby firms,or reduce the
costs of criminal organization naturally
vary across specific subindustriesof constructionactivity.Therefore, some subindustries are more susceptible to crime
than others. All subindustries that are
criminallycontrolled must, however, display some signs of marketpower. Market
power implies the barriers to entry that
inhibit markets, that create and protect
monopoly rents,and that keep the number of firms small and monitoring and
enforcementcosts low. An exploration of
the specific sources of monopoly power
helps in understanding the locus and
nature of criminalactivityin the industry.
First,some forcesthatkeep the number
of firmssmall and the size of firmslarge in
certainsubindustriesof constructionoccur
naturally.Regional markets in which assets are immobile, and the minimum
efficientscale of operations is large relativeto demand withinthe region,willhave
a relativelysmall number of firms. In
addition,in subindustrieswhere assets are
highly specialized and industry exit is
costly,the cyclicalityof the market may
encourage a relativelymonopolisticindustrystructure.In such subindustries,monopoly profitsduring upturnswillbe used
to sustain the firm during downturns.
Therefore, regional markets in these
subindustrieswill have monopolistic tendencies.
For example, according to unpublished
informationon construction contractors
provided by the Anti-TrustDivisionof the
U.S. Department of Justice, the AntiTrust Division initiatedcriminal prosecutions in 22 cases of bid-rigginginvolving
utilityconstructioncontractorsin 6 states
between 1982 and 1987; 70 cases in 12

statesand the Districtof Columbia involving electrical contractors between 1983
and 1987; and 337 cases in 23 states
involving road construction contractors
between 1979 and 1987. These three
subindustriesthereforemay have natural
monopolistictendencies.
Governmentregulationsthatattemptto
remedythe problemsof externalitiesare a
second source of monopoly power. For
example, to ensure safetyin underground
work, New York City sewer installation
and repair companies have the exclusive
legal rightto work in the holes theyhave
opened. This unusual form of monopoly
power gives the sewer company sole
authorityto move utilitylines that are in
the way of operations. As a result, the
sewer companies could charge utilitycompanies monopoly prices for these services.
A thirdand obviouslyimportantsource
of monopoly power is the threatof harm
and sabotage, which elevates entrybarriers beyond natural levels. Such threatsare
probably not effectiveat creating entry
barriers where none exist; in healthy
competitivemarkets,violent threatsto all
competing firmsare not credible because
of the magnitude of the activitythreatened. In cases where entrybarriersnaturallykeep the number of competingfirms
small, however, threatsmay elevate existing entrybarriers,since theybecome more
credible when directed at a small number
of firms. Finally, another importanttool
that organized crime has found to control
firmsand marketsis the labor union.
The Labor Union as a Source of
MarketControl
Now, as the [Employers']Association,we
controlthe [employers].
Whenwe controlthe
men we controlthe [employers]even better
because they'reeven more fuckin'afraid.Do
you understandme? When you got an [employer]whostepsoutofline,yougotthewhip.
You gotthefuckin'whip.This is whathe [one
of thecrimebosses]tellsme all thetime.
of crimefig-Interceptedconversation
ure (OCTF 1988:79)
The labor union is an effectivetool of
control because it is a monopolizing
institutionthat can control critical labor
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windows of contractors who used nonunion workersto installwindow glass.
Alternatively,a corrupt union official
can extract rents from employers in
return for "privileges." For example, a
union officialmay allow a contractor,fora
price, to hire specific workers with a
proven trackrecord ratherthan adhering
strictlyto contractual hiring hall provisions. In some instances corrupt union
officials may even grant the contractor
permissionto use nonunion labor, but this
privilegealso has a price. A business agent
of Local 608 of the Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joinersis currentlybeing
prosecuted for allegedly demanding payoffs from undercover agents posing as
representatives of a building owner in
return for the owner's use of nonunion
carpenters(OCTF 1988:17).
Similarly,corrupt union officials may
accept bribes for not enforcing other
costlyprovisionsof the labor contract.For
example, the LILREX "sting operation"
initiatedin 1976 by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Organized Crime
Strike Force for the Eastern District of
New York uncovered a practice by some
But we gottahave thestrength
so thatwhena
contractorsof paying certain workersthe
fuckercomes along and bids [on a contract union hourlyrate but not listingthem on
whichis supposedto be limitedto membersof
a Cosa NostraFamily-sponsored
cartel]tomor- employmentrecords. This practice saved
rowhe'sgotfourGold Tooths7in frontof him the employersthe cost of the pension and
saying"Now that [you've got the contract] welfare contributionsthat were required
where are all the workers?"(Intercepted by the union contract. The workers did
not objectbecause the contractorscertified
ofCrimeFigure,OCTF 1988:79)
Conversation
them as eligible for unemploymentinsurExtortionpaymentsare commonlypaid to
ance (OCTF 1988:28).
ensure uninterruptedwork. In a recent
civil suit against Local 6A of the Cement
A Corrupt Union and the
and Concrete Workers, organized crime
Distributionof Rents Among
figures are alleged to have extorted one
Contractor,Employee, and
percent of the contract price from all
Criminal Actor
ready-mixconcrete contractorsin return
for labor peace (OCTF 1988:19).
Once the criminal organization has
Union members can also destroywork
monopoly power at some point in the
of contractorswhose actions are diminish- constructionprocess, it will tryto approing the market power of the criminal priate economic rents. The redistribution
organization. For example, in 1971, offi- of economic rents from developers, concials of Local 1087 of the Painters were
tractors,and employees to the criminal
convicted of using acid to destroy the
organizer depends on the market forces
governingthe particulartransactionsand
the
strategyof the criminalorganizer.
7 Gold Tooth: nickname
of a Lucchese-controlled
Because there is no long-standingrelauniondelegate.
resources in all phases of a construction
project. Not all labor unions in New York
City constructionare corrupt, of course.
In some unions the leadership and members are free of any taint, and in other
cases there are efforts by members to
reformtheirown unions internally.Organized crimeunquestionablycontrolsunions
in some subindustriesof New York City
construction, however; and supplanting
entrenched corrupt unions with new
"clean" ones is difficult.For example, the
effortsof apparently honest men to gain
positions of leadership in New York
carpenters' union locals have repeatedly
been thwarted. As a dramatic example,
campaign in 1975,
aftera life-threatening
Willie Nordstrom, who appears to have
been free of criminal connections, was
voted in as business manager for Carpenters Local 488 in the Bronx-and in 1978
he was murdered (OCTF 1988:33-34).
The corruptlabor union can use threats
of sabotage and work stoppages to extort
payments from employers and to discipline firms that do not play by the
criminals'rules:
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Figure 1. The SurplusAccruingto Employers,
Wages .

Labor, and the Union in DifferentMarket Situations.
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tionship between the firm and most
employees in this industry,construction
unions are oftenin the unusual positionof
allocatingboth jobs to workersand workers to employers-a position that offers
the corruptunion officialthe opportunity
to exploit both parties to the employment
transaction. The extent of exploitation
that can occur will vary across subindustries,however, depending on the union's
power in each case.
The corrupt union officialpresumably
seeks the strategy that maximizes the
potential rents available for extortion.
Consider firstthe extreme case in which
the union acts as both monopsonist (allocating all jobs to all workers)and monopolist (allocating all workersto all employers). In that case, the union official,when
faced withthe demand and supply curves
displayed in Figure la, will choose the
monopsonistwage and employmentlevels,
Wasand Lmsboth of whichare lower than
the corresponding competitivelevels, W,
and L. This strategy maximizes the
employer surplus (the shaded area in
Figure la).
The corrupt union official will then
charge the employer a fee equal to some
portion of the employer's surplus to
ensure delivery of the labor services.
Although the sum of wage paymentsand
employersurplusequals the value of labor
employed, extortion of the full surplus
mightwell reduce the contractors'profits
below minimumlevels necessaryfor market survival.If the employerdoes not pay,
the union officialhas the power to impose

delays or work stoppages and to organize
sabotage of the constructionprocess.8
It is highlyunlikely,however, that any
union has the absolute power portrayedin
Figure la, particularlyin a labor market
such as New York City, where workers
have the opportunity to work in many
differentindustriesand occupations.More
likely, the corrupt union official will be
forced to negotiate at least a competitive
wage to attractworkers. In this case the
strategythat maximizes the potential extortionfee is to negotiate the competitive
wage and employmentlevels, W, and L,
of Figure lb, and extort some portion of
the employersurplus given by the shaded
triangle.
Perhaps mostlikely,even corruptunion
officials in an urban labor market will
8
An extortionfee equal to the employer surplus
in the labor market transaction is similar to the
introduction of a two-part tariff in the product
market. This tariff or fee in a product market
transactiontransferssome or all of the consumer
surplus from consumer to monopolist. Oi (1975)
used the example of Disneyland to illustratehow the
monopolistbenefitsfromchargingan admission fee
as well as unit prices for each serviceconsumed.
The labor market and product market cases are
not, however, entirely analogous. The employer's
surplus in the labor market transaction does not
correspond directlyto profits.For example, in the
short run, if labor is the only variable factor, the
employer surplus in the labor market transaction
must be used to pay for fixed costs. Therefore, as
noted in the text, a strategythat extorts the full
employer surplus in this case will be self-defeating,
resulting in negative profitsin the short run and
drivingthe firmout of the industryin the long run.
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usually find that they must negotiate a
contract wage equal to some monopoly
wage rate (Wrnn). Although construction
unions enjoy the advantages of exclusive
jurisdictionover certain production tasks,
differentunions with their own exclusive
jurisdictions often employ workers with
similar skills. If an honest union and a
corrupt union representingworkerswith
similarskillsnegotiate separate labor contracts,the agreement of the honest union
may constrainthe strategyof the corrupt
union. Even in undemocraticunions, that
is, membershipdissatisfactioncan impose
some pressures on union officials.
Therefore, negotiations between corrupt unions and employersmay result in
the monopoly wages, Wrnn, shown in
Figure lb. In this case the maximum fee
the corrupt union officialcan extortfrom
the employer, in return for delivery of
employment services, is the employer
surplus associated with monopoly wages
(the checkered area in Figure lb). Again,
thisfee maybe furtherconstrainedsince it
must remain below the level that would
drive contractorsout of the industryand
deprive crime bosses of their income.
Under thisthirdscenario,the existenceof
organized crime in a union may not yield
contractwage paymentslower than those
negotiated by honest unions, but it still
transferssome profitsfromthe developercontractorto the corruptunion officials.
The three preceding scenarios show
that wages and extortionfees will depend
on the level of monopsonisticcontrol of
the corrupt union official. Other things
equal, the more monopsonisticthe power
of the union, the lower the wages paid to
union workersand the higher the potential extortion fee for the union official.
Extortionfees can persist,however,onlyif
they are financed by monopoly profitsin
the product market or if contractorscan
pass on increasesin labor costsin the form
of higher prices. Because it may be more
profitable for the corrupt unions to
bargain with employers who can extract
monopoly profits by exerting market
power of theirown, a corruptlabor union
may employ strategies that extend its
monopolypower into the employingfirms'
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market.9For example, labor unions could
withholdservicesfromcertaincontractors
while colluding with others to reduce the
number of contractorsin the market. If
the contractormarketcan be made more
monopolistic,potential extortionfees will
be greater.
The preceding analysismakes no reference to the effectof criminal control of
the union on unreported or "underthe-table" wages. When the strategies
described above are employed, workers
either are unaware of the illegal activity
between the corruptofficialof theirunion
and the contractor or experience no
disutility from working in a corrupt
organization. More likely, at least some
workerswillbe aware of any illegal activity
and will demand extra compensation in
returnforthe disutilityof workingin such
a union. A corrupt union official faced
withworkerdemands forextra compensation-bribes-in return for ignoring illegal activity can respond by increasing
either the workers' reported earnings or
theirunreported earnings.
If employees do require bribes, the
labor supply curve that includes these
bribes (Sb in Figure 2) will be above the
original labor supply curve that does not
incorporate bribes (Snb). The union official, deciding whetheror not to engage in
illegal activity,must recognize that his
illegal activitycan shiftthe supplycurve in
this manner.
Under the Sb supply curve, the union
9 There need not necessarilybe monopoly power
in the product marketin order for a corrupt union
officialto practice extortion.The union can charge
extortion fees to firms in a perfectlycompetitive
product marketif the product marketdemand curve
is downward sloping and the union extortsfromall
of the competingfirms.In thiscase the extortionfee
is a fixed cost that all firmsmust pay. Prices rise in
the product market to cover the increased average
costs,and total output falls.
The transaction costs associated with extortion
probably increase dramatically, however, as the
number of firms paying extortion fees increases.
Therefore,the transactioncosts involvedin charging
an extortionfee to all firmsin a competitivemarket
are probablyso high that such a strategywould not
be profitable.These costs are another incentivefor
the corrupt union official to try to reduce the
number of contractorsin the product market.
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official has two strategies. First, he can
simply take the Sb curve into account,
when negotiatinga wage, instead of the
Snb curve. For example, if the union
official were negotiating a competitive
wage, he would negotiate Wb instead of
W,. However, the increase in the negotiated wage above W, reduces the available
extortionfee.
Alternatively,the corrupt union official
can negotiate wages according to the
original Snb curve and then use the
extortionfee to bribe workersonly when
necessary. The union officialengages in
this alternative strategy only if he can
offerseparate bribes to each worker. For
example, if the union official negotiates
Wc,the competitivewage associated with
the Snb curve, those workers between Lo
and L1 on the Sb curve in Figure 2 will not
demand a bribe. W, is sufficientto cover
the "bribe" these workers require before
theyagree to work in this market.Workers on the Sb curve between L1 and L,
however,will demand a bribe in excess of
W,. If the union officialcan offerseparate
bribes to each worker, the value of the
bribes will be equal to the shaded area in
Figure 2.
Separate bribesnegotiatedbetweenindividual workersand theirunion officialare
plausible since the illegalityof the bribe
preventsworkersfrom making their "under-the-table"payment known to other
workers.This alternativestrategywill be
chosen by the union officialif the resulting extortion fee, surplus less bribes, is
larger than the extortion fee associated
withthe strategyof negotiatingthe higher

wage, Wb.'0 In general, the extortionfee
associated with the strategyof selective
bribery will be larger the smaller the
number of workersdemanding a bribe in
excess of the competitive wage and the
lower the average bribe payment."
Unreported earnings or bribe payments
maycome in a varietyof forms.The union
official may personally make cash transfers to union members, or he may give
these workers"no show" jobs or shiftsin
which paid hours are greater than hours
worked.
Testing the Economic Hypotheses
We have hypothesized that some features of constructionactivitymake certain
subindustriesof constructionparticularly
susceptible to crime. We have also suggested ways in which market forces constrain the attemptsof organized crime to
profit from sources of market power.
Unfortunately,the available data do not
permita rigoroustestof those hypotheses.
In this section we review published statistics on product market and labor market
characteristicsin the constructionmarkets
of the New York City SMSA and other
large SMSAs, and consider to what extent
these data support the theoreticalpropositions of the previous sections. Since the
data consistentlyleave many, if not most,
importantissues unresolved, we also dis10Depending on the
placement and shape of the
relevant demand and supply curves, the rentmaximizingstrategymayalso take some intermediate
formin whichnegotiatedwages are between Wb and
W, and some bribe paymentsexist.
1l If the union officialnegotiatesa monopolywage
according to Sb, the union premium may already
cover the bribe required by the marginal worker.
Therefore, corrupt activities will not affect the
negotiated wage. If, however, the union wage
premium leaves earned wages below levels that
would compensate the marginalworkerfor working
in a corruptunion, the union officialwillagain have
to decide between two strategies. He will either
negotiate a higher wage that covers the bribe
demanded by the marginal workeror keep wages at
monopoly levels and bribe only those workerswho
demand further compensation for working with
corrupt unions. A comparison of the resulting
extortionfees will guide his decision.
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cuss what kinds of data would permit
more thoroughanalysis.
Product Market Comparisons
Above, we argued that marketpower is
a necessary attribute of any criminally
controlled subindustryin construction.If
that argument is correct,an examination
of the size distributionof firms in the
various subindustriesacross cities should
give some indicationof whichconstruction
processes maybe controlledmore easilyby
organized crime. These statisticsshould
also suggest whetherthe locus of monopoly controlin New York Citydiffersfrom
that in other cities. Unfortunately,detailed informationon the size distribution
of firms at the municipal level is not
available. The only relevant published
informationis average firmsize, not the
size distributionaround the average. Specifically,the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1982b) reportsnumber of establishments
and receipts-per-establishment
by SMSA
for 27 detailed constructionsubindustries.
These data yield a measure of average
firmsize in each SMSA for each detailed
industry, as measured by receiptsper-establishmentexpressed in New York
Citydollars.'2 This statisticis at best a very
crude proxy of marketpower.
An examination of these data reveals
thatin eightof the 27 industrygroups, the
average firm size in the New York City
SMSA exceeds the average firmsize across
the next ten largest SMSAs, across the 26
Northeastern SMSAs reported by the
Census of ConstructionIndustries (CCI),
and across all 86 SMSAs reportedby CCI.
Specifically,relative to the average adjusted receipts-per-establishmentfigure
for the next ten largest SMSAs, the
average New York Citycontractorreceives
revenues that are 27.6% greater in industry 1542-nonresidential buildings other
than industrialbuildings and warehouses;
358.8% greater in industry 1622-heavy
12
The Dodge Digestof BuildingCostsand Specifications(1983) gives a cost index for 184 cities in the
United Statesand Canada. These cost data were used
to convert all receipt figures to New York City
dollars.
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constructionotherthan highways,bridges,
tunnels, and elevated highways; 8.3%
greater in industry 1623-water, sewer,
and utilitylines; 22.1% greaterin industry
1721-painting and paper hangingsubcontractors;27.1 % greaterin industry1741masonryand plastering;73.5% greaterin
industry 1742-plastering, drywall, and
insulation; 37.4% greater in industry
1771-concrete; and 82.2% greater in
industry 1796-special trade contractors
for installationof miscellaneous building
equipment.
The OCTF (1988) reports many examples of criminal activityin most of those
eight subindustries in which New York
Cityfirmsare, on average, relativelylarge.
The detail of the criminal schemes described by OCTF suggests, however, the
inadequacy of examining firm size as a
signal of criminal activity.Statisticsthat
describe the dispersion of firmsizes more
completely, such as four- or eight-firm
concentrationratios,would be much more
likelyto reflectthese schemes than would
average firmsize.
For example, in 1985, federal prosecutors proved that a "Club" of contractors
in the concrete industry,one of the eight
industries with relativelylarge firms in
New York City, controlled any concrete
contract with a value over two million
dollars. Non-club contractors who attempted to serve this marketwere threatened with physical harm and problems
with supplies and labor (OCTF 1988:
82-84). The CCI reports that in 1982
receipts in the New York City SMSA
concrete market were $347 million (Bureau of the Census 1982b, Table 12,
NY- 18), suggesting there was enough
business in this subindustry to attract
many firmsother than the club members,
and thus create the need for the few club
members to "discipline" those not in the
club. If the "Club" in New York City did
exert more monopoly power than the
large concrete firmsin other cities, however, detailed concentrationratios across
cities would reflect the Concrete Club's
arrangements more directlythan would
average firmsize.
Although the problems of measuring
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monopoly power are considerable, they
are relativelyminor compared to the task
of measuring criminal activity. Even if
proxies for criminal activity,such as the
amount of resources devoted to criminal
prosecutionin a specificindustry,existed,
such proxies would be of little use.
Criminal activitymay be most prevalent
where it is least documented. If crime is
particularlyprofitable,criminalsmay take
the strongest precautions to keep their
activityconcealed.

of reported wages between union and
nonunion workersin differentmetropolitan areas. The theoreticalarguments we
have outlined suggestthata corruptunion
official has an incentive to keep legal
wages as low as possible. Empirical estimates from wage regressionscan provide
limited testsof whetherunion officialsin
New York City have kept union wages
relativelylow compared to union wages in
other metropolitanareas.
The followingreduced-formwage equation forconstructionworkersis estimated:

Labor Market Comparisons

(1) ln(Wj) = a + bX +

We have argued thatconstructionunions
can be an importantsource of monopoly
power. According to merged data for the
12 monthlyCensus of Population Surveys
(CPS) for 1984 presented in Table 1, this
potential source of monopoly power is
particularly pronounced in New York
City. 55.5% of all constructionworkersin
the New York City SMSA are union
members, and 63.3% are covered by a
labor contract.The extentof unionization
in the New York CitySMSA is about twice
that across the next ten largest U.S.
SMSAs or across all U.S. SMSAs. In fact,
the New York City SMSA has the highest
unionizationrates of all U.S. SMSAs. It is
also reasonable to assume thatwithinNew
York Cityitself,the percentageof construction workerswho are membersof a union
or who are covered by a collectivebargaining contractis considerablyhigher than in
the entire New York CitySMSA.
The 1984 CPS data allow a comparison

X contains a set of variables affectingthe
supply or demand of constructionlabor.
NYC iS a dummy variable for construction
workersin the New York CitySMSA.
The demand for constructionworkers
underlyingthis reduced-formequation is
a functionof the skilllevel,education, and
experience of workers. The supply of
workers to the regional industrywill be
affectedbywages in labor marketscompeting for workers with similar skills. In
addition to determinantsof the supply of
and demand for construction workers,
wages will also depend on institutional
forces,most notablyunionism,that affect
the operation of the constructionlabor
markets.
Estimating the reduced-form construction industry wage equation yields
the parameters in column 1 of Table
2. Since the alternative wage variables
that measure difference in the cost of
living are SMSA-level variables, the

bNyc(NYC)

+

e

Table 1. Extent of Unionization of Construction Workers in New York City
and Other SMSAs, 1984.

Data Description
Observations

All U.S.
Other
Than N.Y.C

N.Y. City
SMSA

NextJ0
Largest
SMSASa

All SMSAs
Other
Than NYCb

167

1,332

4,903

9,432

1. Union Member

55.5%

28.7%

26.7%

23.8%

2. Covered by Union Contract

63.3%

30.7%

28.3%

25.3%

Source:1984 Census of Population Surveydata tapes-merged sample of all constructionindustryworkersin
twelvemonthlyfiles.All statisticsare calculated using CPS sampling weights.
a The ten largest SMSAs other than New York City in 1984 were: Los Angeles-Long Beach; Chicago;
Philadelphia; Detroit; San Francisco-Oakland; Washington, D.C.; Boston; Nassau and Suffolk Counties;
Pittsburgh;and St. Louis.
b The CPS identifies44 separate SMSAs in its 1984 data files.
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Table 2. Determinants of Reported Hourly Wages of Metropolitan Construction Workers, 1984.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Variable
Experience
Experience Squared
Region:
Northeast
North Central
South
Blue-Collar
Female
Black
Married
AlternativeWages:
Craftsmen
Manufacturing
Operatives
Union Member
Percent Union

All
Construction
Workers
(1)

Union
Members
Only
(2)

All
Construction
Workers
(3)

Union
Members
Only
(4)

.027***
(.002)
-.00047***
(.00004)

.019***
(.004)
-.00036***
(.00004)

.027***
(.002)
-.00047***
(.00004)

.019***
(.004)
-.0004***
(.0001)

-.059***
(.023)
-.027
(.024)
- .026
(.027)
-. 182***
(.023)
- .364***
(.028)
- .178***
(.026)
.133***
(.017)

-.147***

-.061**
(.026)
-.030
(.028)
- .027
(.027)
- . 182***
(.023)
-.364***
(.028)
-.177***
(.026)
.133***
(.017)

.137***
(.041)
- .012
(.043)
- . 147***
(.051)
.087
(.053)
-.161*
(.086)
- .241***
(.038)
.144***
(.029)

.561***
(.157)
.269*
(.148)
- .216*
(.115)
.347***
(.017)
-

.758***
(.259)
-.166
(.253)
- .213
(.188)

.638***
(.172)
.270*
(.148)
- .250**
(.117)
.348***
(.018)
.0002
(.0010)
.0002
(.0419)
2,882
.402

.837***
(.290)
- .175
(.254)
- .232
(.190)

New York City

(.0.37)
-.025
(.038)
- . 139***
(.049)
.086
(.053)
- .162*
(.085)
- .241***
(.038)
.144***
(.029)

-

-

.003
.015
(.038)
(.051)
930
Observations
2,882
R2
.207
.402
* Significantat the .10 level; ** significantat the .05 level;

sample for analysis is restrictedto those
individuals who reside in one of the 44
SMSAs indentifiedin the CPS data files.
The results in column 1 reveal wage
patterns in metropolitanconstructionlabor markets that are similar in many
respects to those observed in wage equations estimated for broader ranges of
industries.The returnsto experience are
positive, but the positive return declines
with more experience. Better-educated
workers are more highly paid. Negative

-.001
(.002)
.033
(.058)
930
.208

significantat the .01 level (two-tailedtests).

wage differentialsfor women and blacks
exist in U.S. constructionlabor markets.
As expected, the wages paid to craftsmen
in industriesother than constructionappear to be the best measure of an
alternativewage for constructionindustry
workers.
The coefficienton the union member
variable in this 1984 constructionindustry
sample is .347, indicating a somewhat
larger cross-sectionestimateof the union/
nonunion wage differentialthan exists in
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many other industries.According to the
theoretical arguments advanced in this
study, this relatively large union wage
premium is inconsistent with pervasive
corruptionin constructionunions nationwide. Specifically,if constructionunions
throughout the country were dominated
by corruptunion officials,the strategyfor
the corrupt union officials of keeping
wages as low as possible would produce
union wages comparable to nonunion
wages.
Furthermore, the coefficient on the
New York City variable in line 10 is not
significantlydifferentfrom zero. Therefore, after controllingfor the effectsof
regional and local area wage differentials,
and occupational,demographic,and unionization characteristicsof workers,there is
no significantpay differentialassociated
withworkingin the New York CitySMSA.
When the wage regressionis reestimated
in column 2 for the sample of union
workers,the coefficienton the New York
Cityvariable is again insignificant.'3
This result could be interpreted as
evidence against widespread corruptionin
New York City constructionunions. That
is, theorysuggests that if New York City
constructionunions were dominated by
corrupt union officials and unions in
other metropolitanareas were not, union
wages in New York City would be, other
thingsequal, below union wages in other
metropolitanareas.
coefficienton the New
The insignificant
York City variable in the column 2
equation for union workers could, however, still be evidence of relativelylow
union wages for New York City workers.
Since wages generally increase with the
degree of unionization (Freeman and
13
The patternsof wage determinationrevealed in
Table 2 remain when alternative subsamples of
workers are analyzed. If one is particularlyconcerned about illegal activityin certain craft unions,
the analysis should focus on union construction
workers.Wage equations similarto the column 1 and
2 models in Table 2 were estimatedforthe sample of
constructioncraftworkers (that is, detailed occupational categoryno. 34) and the sample of unionized
constructioncraftworkers.In neithercase were the
coefficientson the New York City SMSA variable
differentfromzero.
significantly

Medoff 1981), and since the New York
City SMSA is the most highly unionized
SMSA in the country,the coefficienton
the New York Citydummyvariable in the
column 2 model should be both positive
and significant. The insignificantNew
York City coefficient therefore could
indicate downward pressure on wages by
corruptunion officials.
To explore thispossibilitymore directly,
the column 1 and 2 wage equations are
reestimatedafterincludingthe percentage
of the SMSA constructionlabor market
that is unionized as another possible
determinantof constructionworkers'earnings. The column 3 specificationincludes
all construction workers in the sample,
whereas the column 4 specificationkeeps
only union membersin the sample. In the
column 3 model, the coefficienton the
percent union variable measures a premium enjoyed by both union and nonunion workers.It is also useful to measure
the effectof the percentunion variable on
the earningsof union membersexclusively
(column 4) because percent organized has
a larger effect on union wages than on
nonunion wages (Freeman and Medoff
1981:567).
The results in columns 3 and 4 do not
show constructionwages increasing with
percent organized. In neither the all
worker sample nor the union worker
sample is the coefficienton percent union
differentfromzero.
significantly
Furthermore,this findingis not simply
a result of the failure of New York City
unions to use theirpotentiallabor market
power to increase the wages of their
members as much as they could have.
Since New York Cityhas the highestlevel
of constructionunionizationof any SMSA,
unusual wage-setting behavior by New
York Cityconstructionunions may have a
large impact on the estimatedlinear effect
of percent organized on wages. Specifically, there may be a significantpositive
relationship between percent organized
and wages across the metropolitan markets other than New York; but if New
York Cityunions use theirunusuallygreat
labor market power to keep wages well
below the level thatcould be attained,the
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inclusion of New York City construction
workers in the sample could reduce the
estimatedpercent organized coefficient.
That possible effect,however,is not the
reason for the insignificantcoefficienton
percent organized. In models not reported in the table, New York City
workers are excluded from the samples
for the columns 3 and 4 wage equations.
In these models, the coefficientson the
percentorganized variableare again virtuallyzero. Other thingsequal, greaterlabor
market power, as measured by extent of
unionization, did not increase wages or
the size of the union wage premium for
constructionworkersin anycityin 1984.
coeffiTaken together,the insignificant
cient on percent organized in all models
and the insignificantcoefficienton the
New York City variable indicate that
corruptionamong union officialsin New
York City is not so pervasive that it leads
to relativelylow wages for New York City
constructionworkers.On the other hand,
thereis also no evidence that,other things
equal, union wages are any higher in New
York Citythan theyare in other metropolitan areas, despite the higher degree of
unionization in New York City, thus
refutingthe hypothesisthatcorruptunion
officials "buy off" their members with
higher legal wages.
Although there is no evidence that
union wages in New York City construction systematicallydiffer from those in
constructionelsewhere,thatfindingby no
means proves thatcriminalactivityin New
York Cityconstructionunions is no higher
than in constructionunions in other cities.
In particular,although we suggested that
corrupt union officialsmight negotiate a
monopoly wage comparable to the wage
negotiated by honest unions, we also
pointed out thatcriminalactivityresultsin
extortion fees and, possibly, "underthe-table"bribe payments to a subset of
workers.
Attempts to empirically gauge differences in unreportedearnings or extortion
fees face insurmountable data collection
and measurementproblems. One possibilityforfutureresearchwould be a comparative study of labor costs of firms,rather
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than individuals,across regional construction markets.Firm-leveldata may measure
differencesin legal and illegal paymentsto
labor more accurately than individuallevel data. The success of such a study
depends, however, on whether extortion
fees paid to union officialsare reportedas
labor costs; and even if such fees are
reported,it is not clear how theywould be
categorized. The analysis could, alternatively,focus on the differencein totalcosts
of firmsacross regional constructionmarkets. However, that approach would not
be without difficultieseither, since elevated construction costs in a certain
metropolitanarea could indicate criminal
schemes by corrupt firmsor government
officials rather than by corrupt union
officials. In fact, the OCTF (1988:30)
reports that the cases in which construction contractorshave inflatedinvoicesand
cost figuresto reduce tax liabilityare "too
numerous to catalogue."
Conclusion
Devising effective strategies to fight
organizedcrimein New York Cityconstruction will clearly require building more
knowledgeabout the systematicforcesthat
have made it such a long-standingfeature
of the industry.The economic principles
and hypotheses that can be brought to
bear in addressing this difficultproblem
remain largely untested and untestable
withouta greater knowledge base. Policy
makers must, however, formulate remedies and evaluate alternativesusing whatever evidence and ideas are available.
The economic principles and hypotheses suggested in this study, although
inherentlydifficultto test,do raise a set of
questions thatshould be considered in the
dialogue on possible remedial strategies.
In particular, this study suggests that
proposed policy initiativesshould be evaluated in terms of whether they improve
the coordination and reliabilityof the
constructionprocess,therebyreducingthe
demand for criminal activity; raise the
expected costsof illegal activityby increasing both the size of penalties and the
probabilityof detection; increase competi-
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tion and weaken monopoly control over
specific markets and transactions; and
make more efficientthe regulations pertainingto the externalitiesof construction
activity.
Obviously, the odds are against any
proposed new remedy succeeding where
othershave failed for many decades. One
problem is that often a policy aimed at
eliminatingone criminalactivitymay do so
only at the cost of opening the way to
others. For example, remedies aimed at
introducingmore competitorsinto specific
constructionmarkets-such as measures
to increase nonunion competition-will
also, by their very nature, reduce the
abilityof constructioncontractorsto coordinate activitiesand lead to an even less
reliable construction process, increasing
the demand for criminal organization.
Similarly,expedited arbitrationof labor
disputesand workstoppages mightreduce
delays in the constructionprocess. Organized crime would have a strongincentive
to gain controlof the centralizeddecisionmaking institutiontherebycreated, however, since centralized processes tend to
make criminalactivityless costly.Furthermore, if a systemwithoutarbitrationhas
served organized crime well, the criminal
organization might attemptto sabotage a
newlyinstalledarbitrationsystemby clogging it with trivial and fabricated cases,
which could make the systemslow, costly,
unresponsive, and possibly more timeconsumingthan the currentapproaches to
labor disputes.
Again, any strategythat increases competition in labor markets may make the
labor allocation process more inefficient.
Since there is no long-standingemployment relationshipbetween most workers
and firmsin the constructionprocess, the
union plays a centralrole in the allocation
of labor across firms.Part of the price of
this service is greater union control over
the employment transaction. Proposed
alternativesthat would replace or supplement union hiring halls with nonunion
hiringmethods,such as communityhiring
hiringprohallsor employer-administered
grams (OCTF 1988:101), have their own
drawbacks.Employer-administeredhiring

programs would probably carry higher
search and hiring costs; and if hiring
decisions shifted to community hiring
halls, organized crime would focus its
resources on controllingthat new institutional mechanismfor allocatinglabor.
Empiricalstudiesthatdeterminewhether
criminalcontrol of constructionis prevalent in metropolitanareas other than New
York City may be helpful in designing
policy. In particular, many of the economic factorsthatmightpromotecriminal
organization of constructionactivityare
not confinedstrictly
to New York City.For
example, the sequential nature of transactionsand the specificityof assets in certain
constructionmarketsnaturallylead to the
formationof large firmswithmonopolistic
control. If criminal activity in certain
constructionsubindustriesoccurs in many
metropolitanareas, policies should focus
on these subindustries,and on the economic conditions that make them attractive to organized crime.
If, on the other hand, criminal activity
in certain construction subindustries is
specific to New York City, then the
economic forces that promote criminal
organizationare those thatare particularly
pronounced in New York City. For example, the problemsof coordinatingconstruction projects may be especiallydifficultin
New York City because of the scarcityof
space and the density of the residential
and commercialpopulation. For the same
reasons, the regulations governing New
York City construction may be more
extensiveand complex than those governing constructionin other cities. In this
case, policies specific to New York that
address these local economic and legal
factorswould be more appropriate.
In summary,an analysis of organized
crimethatuses the tools and perspectiveof
economistshas certainstrengthsand weaknesses. Theories of product markets,labor
markets,and the organizationof the firm
identifyeconomic forcesthat attractorganized crime. Since at least part of the motivationfor criminalcontrol of New York
City'sconstruction
industryis economic,this
theoreticalperspectiveis an importantpart
of a comprehensive examination of the
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causes, persistence, and effectsof organized crime. As is generallythe case with
theoriesconcerningcriminalcontrolof industry,however,thehypothesizedrelationships cannot be rigorouslytested; theycan
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onlybe supported withanecdotal information.Despite theseinherentlimitations,the
theoreticalconsiderationsdo raise fundamental issues and questions that can help
informpolicydiscussions.
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